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Michael Stuckey-
In the early seventeenth century superimposed on the certitude
that periods of discord are trying ones for judges there was an increasing-
ly political dimension in the law of defamation. This was difficult
enough, but juries might, of course, make the most exorbitant awards of
damages, and then arose the question of whether the court could or
should intervene.
The action on the case for defamatory words is a comparatively
recent development in the common law, having its origins in the early
sixteenth century.' It is also significant that the action underwent a
significant substantive expansion in the politically heated early years of
the seventeenth century. Prior to the emergence of the action, harmful
words were the province of either the ecclesiastical or the criminal
courts. Baker has speculated that the reason for what appears to be "a
deliberate new departure" was the perceived deficiencies in the law
resulting from various legislative and common law-judicial interferences
with the spiritual remedies.' Damages had never been available from the
. Michael Stuckey is Lecturer at the Faculty of Law, University of
Newcastle.
' See generally J.M. Kaye, Libel and Slander - Two Torts Or One?, 91 LAW
QUARTERLY REVIEW (1975), pp. 524-539.
2 J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION To ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY. (London:
Butterworths, 1990), pp. 495-497 and also J.H. BAKER, THE REPORTS OF JOHN
SPELMAN. (2nd vol.), (94 Selden Society, 1978), pp. 239-240, where particular
reference is made to the 1528 edition of the Natura Brevium and the role of
Wolsey.
TILBURG FOREIGN LAW REVIEW
ecclesiastical courts and the statutory actions such as the scandalum
magnatum of 1378, usually confined recovery to particular classes of
plaintiffs. From the outset of this action, as with other forms of tort, it
was the jury which assessed the quantum of damages.3 The jury's role
as the arbitrator of the amount of damages was one which judges were
unwilling to trespass upon, especially in the periods when the defamation
action was either novel or undergoing its subsequent expansion.
One of the clearest instances of judicial reluctance to interfere
with a jury' s assessment was Hawkins v. Sciet. Helmholz quoting from
Hawkins v. Sciet, states:
"...in 1622 an attempt to reduce damages of one hundred
and fifty pounds to fifty pounds in a slander case was
refused 'sur grand avise' on appeal the justices holding
that they did not wish to change the course of the law
and that it was best to leave the question of damages 'to
the finding of the jury which best knows the quality of
the person, and their estate, and the damages which they
may sustain from such disgrace'."'
Hawkins v. Sciet was a case where the defendant had called the
plaintiff a bankrupt. Other than this, the report is scant of detail indeed.6
3 On which see G.T. Washington, Damages In Contract At Common Law,
47 AND 48 LAw QUARTERLY REvIEw (1931 AND 1932), respectively 345, pp.
345-346 and 90, pp. 90-108.
4 (1622) Palmer 314; 81 ER 1099.
1 R.M. Helmholz, Civil Trials and the Limits of Responsible Speech in R.H.
HELMHOLZ AND T.A. GREEN, JURIES, LIBEL, AND JUSTICE: THE ROLE OF
ENGLISH JURIES IN SEVENTEENTH- AND EIGHTEENT-CENTURY TRIALS FOR
LIBEL AND SLANDER. (Los Angeles: William Andrews Clark Memorial Library,
University of California, 1984), 3, pp. 22-23.
6 So scant indeed that it is possible to reproduce it in its entirety here: "In
action sur case p appeller luy un banckrupt, fur general issue fuit trove p le plt',
& 150 1. damages done; et p cest grand damage le Court p ascun circumstances
reduce eux al 50 1. Mes apres sur grad advice, ils ceo revoke, & ne voilent
changer le course de ley, et resolve p lever teils matters de fact al trover de
jury, q mieulx conusont le quality del pson, & lour estate, & damage q poent
sustaine p tiel disgrace; aliter lou le action est ground sur cause, q poet appeare
al view del Court, sur q ils poet Judge; coe in maihem, &c. Et accordat est Dy.
105. Et issint ils done judgmt p le 150 1. accordant al verdict."
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This case, and Helmholz's analysis of it, constitutes a threshold in the
problem of judicial intermeddling in the jury's assessment of damages in
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century defamation cases.
The report of Hawkins v. Sciet does cite as authority for the
decision of the court the 1554 precedent of Bonham v. Lord Sturton7 . In
Bonham it was also argued whether it was for the court to mitigate the
award of damages made by the jury. The report of Bonham is consider-
ably more descriptive than the meagre law-french of Hawkins. Detailed
glosses to the judgment in Bonham, added to the report in later years
reveal that the issue of the jury's power to award damages was not so
straight forward as might initially be thought from Helmholz's rendering
of Hawkins. If nothing else the glosses indicate that the issue became one
of contention. But the glosses aside, the bare finding of the court in
Bonham was that:
"...it was adjudged that [the court] could not [mitigate the
jury's award] because the damages are the principal."
Central to Helmholz's analysis of these issues is the proposition
that courts of the period did not seek to separate the issues of liability
and assessment of damages in the way we now do. The corollary, for
Helmholz, is that it is possible to discern, over time, a coincidence in the
increase of judicial supervision of substantive matters with an increase in
judicial influence over the jury's award of damages.' This is no doubt an
accurate observation: only thirty-two years after Hawkins v. Sciet there is
what Helmholz has (subsequently) purported to be the first instance of
just such judicial intervention.9 In Wod v. Gunston it was ordered
(pursuant to the jury's award of 1500 pounds to the plaintiff) that a new
trial must be held. In this case counsel for the plaintiff, Sergeant
Maynard, argued that it was wrong for the court to question the partiality
of the jury after a verdict had been reached and furthermore that the
order for a new trial in such circumstances was without precedent.
' (1554) Dyer 1:105a; 73 ER 230. Also referred to by HELMHOLZ, 10c. cit.
and at n.77.
8 HELMHOLZ, op. cit., pp. 22-24. See also R.H. HELMHOLZ, SELECT CASES
ON DEFAMAION To 1600. (101 Selden Society, 1985).
1 R.H. Helmholz, Damages In Action For Slander At Common Law, 103
LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW (1987), 624, pp. 637.
10 (1655) Style 466; 82 ER 867.
1996]
TILBURG FOREIGN LAW REVIEW
Nevertheless Chief Justice Glyn was convinced that the Court was vested
with a discretion to grant a new trial where a jury had miscarried."
Both Helmholz and Washington make special mention of the fact
that W'od v. Gunston was a case decided during the interregnum - but
then leave this interesting fact for us to ponder.
In any case, it is indisputable that the growth of the "new trial"
procedure was a significant development in the power of the judges to
intervene in a jury's award of damages. Prior to this development it had
always been possible for a court to utilise the attaint procedure to miti-
gate what was thought to be an "erroneous" (excessive) award of dam-
ages.' 2 The procedure involved the establishment of a cumbersome grand
jury. However, by the sixteenth century this procedure had fallen into
disuse. In the meantime, judges in slander cases had taken advantage of
another procedure, the remittitur, to control juries' assessments. 3 This
procedure involved a "forgiving" of the excessive portion of the assessed
damages by the successful plaintiff upon the defendant's application and
the exercise of a judicial discretion. During this period we find not
reluctance but some degree of enthusiasm amongst the judges for inter-
vention. There was a large number of instances where the remittitur
procedure was used to mitigate excessive damages in defamation
cases. 14
In 1622 Hawkins v. Sciet marks the end of the remittitur style of
judicial intervention. According to Helmholz the substantive expansion of
the action for words (to include previously unactionable types of slan-
ders) which had occurred in the first two decades of the seventeenth
century meant that the judges were increasingly unable to assess the
actual damage suffered by the plaintiff.'" The result was the immediate
obsolescence of the remittitur. This left an application for a new trial the
only avenue available to the defendant who believed that the assessment
of damages by the jury was excessive. However, this time judicial
intervention came as a trickle, not a tide. Just as the judges had been
"HELMHOLZ, DAMAGES, p. 637 AND WASHINGTON, op. cit., p. 351.
12 WASHINGTON, op. cit., pp. 346-351.
13 HELMHOLZ, DAMAGES, pp. 629-634.
14 id.
is ibid., pp. 635-638.
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reluctant in the first place to even entertain actions for harmful words so
too (once the action on the case for words had been expanded) were they
generally loath to interfere with the jury's award of damages.' 6 It is
interesting to note that during the more politically and juridically stable
period of the tort, in the latter years of the sixteenth century, judicial
intervention increased. But as the political heat rose and the tort came to
be used for an expanded range of "insults" the issue of judicial interven-
tion became a problematic one, as the glosses to Bonham evidence.
Perhaps it was the case that, in addition to being unable to accurately
assess damages in the expanded compass of the tort, many judges were
also unwilling to play this more active part in potentially dangerous
controversies. In 1676 Chief Justice North with whom Wyndham and
Scroggs JJ agreed, is paraphrased in the report as saying (obiter):
"in civil actions the plaintiff is to recover by way of com-
pensation for the damages he hath sustained, and the jury
are the proper judges thereof... [the trial judge said].. .he
could not tell what value to set upon the honour of the
plaintiff."
17
Times of political unrest are difficult ones for judges. The early
seventeenth century saw the development of an overtly political dimen-
sion in defamation law compound this truism. Juries sometimes made the
most outrageous awards of damages. But the only way out, for the judge
as well as the unsuccessful defendant, was the new trial. Whether
because of inability or reluctance even that device was considered only in
the most extreme circumstances. In Huckle v. Money", almost a century
16 On which see (generally): A.K.R. KIRALFY, POTTER'S HISTORICAL
INTRODUCTION To ENGLISH LAW AND ITS INSTITUTIONS. (London: Sweet and
Maxwell, 1962), pp. 429-438; F. POLLOCK AND F.W. MAITLAND, THE HIs-
TORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I. (volume II, Cam-
bridge, Cambridge University Press, 1968), pp. 536-538; Baker, An Introduc-
tion, pp. 495-508 and Baker, The Reports Of John Spelman, pp. 236-248.
" Lord Townsend v. Hughes (1676) 2 Mod 150; 86 ER 994 at 150-15 1; 994.
However, the dissenting judge, J. Atkins, commented: "...a new trial should be
granted, for it is every day's practice; and he remembered the case of Gouldston
[sic] v. Wood in the King's Bench.. .that Court granted a new trial, because the
damages were excessive.. .if they are too great, the Court may grant a new
trial."
"8 (1763) Wilson 2:205-7; 95 ER 768-769.
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after W9bod v. Gunston, Lord Chief Justice Pratt confidently stated:
"...it is very dangerous for the Judges to intermeddle in
damages for torts; it must be a glaring case indeed of
outrageous damages in a tort and which all mankind at
first blush must think so, to induce a Court to grant a
new trial for excessive damages."
Joost de Reede"
INTRODUCION
The great majority of the Indian population - more than 82 per
cent of the country's population of over 850 million - are of the Hindu
faith. Islam is the second largest religion, and its followers comprise some
11 h % of the population. The Muslim minority in India is larger than the
population of most Islamic countries. Islam has been deeply rooted in India
for many centuries and has made a substantial contribution to the political
and cultural history of the country. This article briefly outlines the position
of the Muslims from a historical and sociological point of view. It then goes
on to consider the main Hindu fundamentalist party - the BJP. Hitherto the
BJP has not succeeded in obtaining a majority in the central Parliament, but
two central Governments have already been dependent on its support. Its
influence seems to be growing.
The Indian Constitution proclaims a secular State in which equality
and non-discrimination are guaranteed for each person, irrespective of his
or her religion. The Constitution also contains a number of specific
guarantees of freedom of conscience. This constitutional system is briefly
described in this article.
The central Government in New Delhi has repeatedly declared that
it champions equal rights for the Muslims and defends the secular character
of the State with the support of a parliamentary majority. Nonetheless, the
Muslims consider that they are discriminated against as a minority, and
there is regular friction and violence between the Hindu and Muslim
communities. This article considers various problems of a general nature:
" Senior lecturer in constitutional law at the University of Amsterdam (the
Netherlands). Translation by UvA Vertalers, University of Amsterdam, Peter Kell.
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first of all, the Kashmir problem (Kashmir being the only State of the Indian
Union to have a Muslim majority), second the continued existence of a
separate Muslim personal and family law contrary to the provisions of the
Constitution and, third, the destruction of the centuries' old mosque at
Ayodhya by fundamentalist Hindus and the measures subsequently taken by
the central Government and the cases decided by the Supreme Court.
The problem of the secular State and the place of the Muslims in it
plays an important role in the various tensions that are described in this
article. The principle of the religious neutrality of the State is by no means
undisputed: it is challenged by both the Muslims and the Hindu
fundamentalists. Nonetheless, the principle seems essential to the stability
and cohesion of the Indian system. It will become evident in this article that
the Supreme Court envisages a central role for itself in maintaining the
secular State.
1. THE MUSLIMS IN INDIA
Islam has been long established in India. Its origin lies in the
various invasions of Muslims which took place in Northern India from the
eleventh century onwards. In the sixteenth century the Mughal Empire was
founded by Muslims originating from Uzbekistan. In due course it extended
over all of northern and central India. The Taj Mahal in Agra, the Red Fort
and the Jama Masjid mosque in Delhi together with numerous other
important monuments in India were built by Mughal rulers. Only in the
south a number of small Hindu kingdoms did survive.
After Aurangzeb (1658-1707), the Mughal Empire fell into decay
and disintegrated into a number of independent states. The last Mughal
emperor was deposed after the Great Mutiny of 1857 and the vast majority
of the subcontinent was placed under direct British rule.
The British rulers strengthened the Muslim's feeling of community
in relation to the Hindus. Since the end of the previous century, the British
had pursued a policy of divide and rule, converting their originally anti-
Islamic policy into support for Islamic organisations as a counterweight to
the Indian National Congress', which was dominated by Hindus. The
' The Indian National Congress, which was founded in 1885, started as a
debating club which was convinced of the blessings of the colonial regime but was
in favour of a greater share in government for the Indian elite. Gradually the
Congress evolved into a popular movement advocating self-rule and, ultimately,
independence.
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colonial administration upheld the privileges of the Islamic elite of princes
and large landowners. A very important factor was the separate
representation of the Muslims following the Indian Councils Act of 1909.
However, the separatist sentiments among the Muslims cannot be attributed
exclusively or indeed even mainly to the British intervention. The Indian
National Congress claimed that it represented all Indians, including
Muslims, and refused at a crucial moment (1937) to work with the Muslim
League - the Islamic popular movement. This attitude confirmed the
Muslims in their fear that the future of their community would never be safe
in an unpartitioned, independent India. These fears were also fuelled by the
regular riots and violence between Hindus and Muslims. All these factors
contributed in 1947 to the partition of the British colony into two States:
religiously neutral India and Islamic Pakistan. This partition of the country
was accompanied by the migration of millions of people and huge
massacres. Nonetheless, a substantial proportion of the Muslims continued
to live in India.
Since independence, relations with Pakistan have produced three
wars (1947-1948, 1965 and 1971). The Kashmir problem played a role in
all three wars, but relations between India and Pakistan have always been
tense quite apart from this issue. As soon as serious acts of violence occur
in India, for example the bomb explosions in Bombay in 1993, the Indian
Government immediately points an accusing finger at Pakistan, even before
a serious investigation has been carried out. The assumption is that Pakistan
obtains assistance from Muslims in India in carrying out such acts of
subversion.
The present position of the Muslims in India is not only determined
by the relationship of India and Pakistan. Also important are the Hindu-
Muslim riots, which tend to occur with the regularity of a clock. Many of
these disturbances are of merely local significance: a pig is found in the
vicinity of a mosque and the Hindus are blamed, a handcart is involved in
a collision with a police jeep and a few copies of the Koran end up on the
ground, or a herd of holy cows led by Hindus gets mixed up with a
procession of Muslims and several Muslims are trampled upon. Despite the
futile nature of the events occasioning such riots, they can cause dozens or
even hundreds of deaths or injuries and poison the atmosphere in a given
area for a long time. Nonetheless, it should be realised that by far the
majority of Muslims in India co-exist peacefully with the Hindus. It is by
no means unusual for the two large religious communities to celebrate each
other's religious festivals.
Economically and socially the position of the Muslims is, on
average, unfavourable. Part of the Muslim community lives in ghettos in the
old cities. The percentage of Muslims in the higher grades of the civil
19961
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service is relatively low, and the Muslims are at a disadvantage in trade and
industry too. The Muslim community tends to be conservative and adopts
a defensive attitude towards the remainder of the population. It should,
however, be noted that India has had Islamic presidents and that Muslims
are regularly appointed as ministers in the central Government in New Delhi
and in State Governments. Political parties generally try to obtain the
support of Islamic leaders in the hope that they will put their vote bank at
the disposal of such parties. In the past the political recommendations of the
shahi imam of the Jama Masjid mosque in Delhi in particular have had a
major influence on the Islamic community in northern India. With the
exception of the Hindu fundamentalist parties, no political party in India can
afford to ignore the power of the Muslim electorate. This has traditionally
been very true of the Congress Party, which is now in power in the central
Government. At national level, parties that represent only Muslim interests
do not play a role of significance.2
2. HINDU FUNDAMENTALISM
Organisations based on Hindu fundamentalist ideology have existed
for a long time in India. The Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh (RSS) and the
Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) are organisations which, although formally
non-political, have close ties with Hindu fundamentalist political parties.
The main national Hindu fundamentalist party since 1951 has been the
Bharatiya Jan Sangh. This party merged with the Janata Party in 1977, but
was re-established in 1980 under the new name Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP). In the State of Maharashtra, there is also the Shiv Sena, which is if
anything even more militant.
These parties take the view that India is fundamentally a Hindu
2 Separate electoral rolls for Muslims have been rejected as a matter of
principle in post-independence India since they are regarded as a cause of Muslim
separatism (see the ban on separate electoral rolls on the ground of religion etc. in
article 325 of the Constitution). Nor are any seats in Parliament specially reserved
for Muslims, even though this is the case for "Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes" (the former category were previously known as Untouchables) and for
Anglo-Indians. After the secession of Pakistan, the Indian Muslims were a much
smaller and fairly mistrusted group. This was why the Islamic members of the
Constituent Assembly which drafted the Indian Constitution waived their demand
for reserved seats in the hope that this sacrifice would guarantee them fair treatment
by the Hindu majority. See GRANVILLE AusTIN, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION.
CORNERSTONE OF A NATION. (Bombay 1972), p. 151.
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country: Islam is regarded as a foreign, non-Indian religion. It is argued that
the Muslims should show greater respect for the Hindu traditions and
culture and that they should either break off all links with Pakistan and
other Islamic countries or should emigrate there. In addition, they should
relinquish their own Muslim family and personal law, should end the
slaughter of cattle, should learn to speak Hindi better (instead of Urdu) and
in general should surrender all privileges which they still are supposed to
enjoy under the present constitutional system. Mosques which were built
many centuries ago by Muslim rulers on the sites of important Hindu
temples should be demolished. History should be rewritten in order to show
the Hindu warriors in a better light who ultimately capitulated to the Sultan
of Delhi and the Mughals. Finally, the Indian State should cease to be of a
secular nature.
The role of the Bharatiya Jan Sangh (later the BJP) has been
important at both national and State level. At the national level, its most
notable achievement hitherto was its involvement in the Desai coalition
Government from 1977 to 1979. This was the first central Government not
to be composed of members of the Congress Party. The Bharatiya Jan
Sangh was in fact formally disbanded not long afterwards in order to merge
with other parties to form the Janata Party. However, this cooperation was
destined to be of short duration, because the Desai Government fell in 1979
as a result of the disintegration of the Janata Party. This was due to the fear
of a number of leaders of the Janata party that members of the disbanded
Bharatiya Jan Sangh were trying with the support of the RSS to capture
power and take over the organisation of the party.
After a short period of office of the interim Government of Charan
Singh3, Congress (I)' came to power under Indira Gandhi. In this period
the members of the former Bharatiya Jan Sangh founded the Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP). Congress (I) remained in power until 1989, during
which time the BJP was in opposition.
In 1989 Congress (I), led by Rajiv Gandhi, who had succeeded his
murdered mother Indira Gandhi, suffered a major defeat in the elections to
the lower House of Parliament (Lok Sabha), and the National Front under
the leadership of V.P. Singh formed a minority Government. This
Government obtained external support from both the BJP and the parties of
' Charan Singh led the splinter Janata Party (S), in which the "S" stood for
"secular", in contrast to the remainder of the Janata Party, of which the former
Bharatiya Jan Sangh formed part.
" Congress (I) was a secession party of the Congress party under the direction
of Indira Gandhi. The (I) stands for Indira.
1996]
TILBURG FOREIGN LAW REVIEW
the left. However, it fell in 1990 when the BJP voted against it in the Lok
Sabha on a motion of confidence. The reason for this was that the leader of
the BJP, Lal Krishna Advani, had been arrested during a demonstration to
support the building of a temple on the site of the mosque at Ayodhya.
Since then the BJP has been in opposition. The lower House
elections of 1991 were won by Congress (I), partly on account of the
murder of Rajiv Gandhi. Subsequently the Government of Narasimha Rao
was formed. At present, the BJP is the largest opposition party in the Lok
Sabha.
As far as the States are concerned, the BJP has in the past formed
Governments in various States. At the time of the Ayodhya incident, which
will be discussed below, the party was in power in the States of Uttar
Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan. All these
Governments were deposed by the central Government in response to the
incident, but in later elections the party once again managed to capture
power in the capital Delhi and the States of Rajasthan (with the support of
independents), Gujarat and Maharashtra (together with the Hindu fundamen-
talist party Shiv Sena, which is very powerful there).' For a short period
the Government in the State of Uttar Pradesh was also dependent on the
external support of the BJP.
The BJP is therefore a substantial power factor both in a number of
States and in national politics. Although the party has been damaged by the
Ayodhya incident and by the events in Gujarat and Uttar Pradesh,6 there
I The Government in Maharashtra has recently taken a number of anti-Islamic
measures: voters in predominantly Muslim areas were informed that they would
have to demonstrate their Indian nationality by reference to a number of official
documents if they wished to exercise their voting rights and not to run the risk of
being deported as aliens (this measure has been quashed by the Supreme Court); in
addition, measures have been taken to start deporting Pakistanis and Bangladeshis
who are illegally resident. The State Minorities Commission, which championed the
welfare of the minorities, has been abolished and the city of Aurangabad, which
was named after the Mughul ruler Aurangzeb, has been given a Hindu name (like
Bombay, which has been renamed Mumbai, the name of a Hindu goddess).
6 In Gujarat a BJP Chief Minister was replaced by a fellow party member
owing to dissension in the ranks of the party. In Uttar Pradesh the BJP briefly
supported the BSP Government of Mayawati. The BSP was a party of and for
Untouchables, and Mayawati herself belonged to this section of the population. It
was ironic that of all parties it should be the BJP, which is regarded as a party of
and for the higher castes, should have supported such a Government. The main
reason for this was that support for the BSP would help to bring about the fall of
the coalition Government led by Mulayam Yadav, who was greatly hated by the
[Vol.5:145
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is still a chance that it may come to power in the central Government too.
Under the Indian electoral system, the candidate is elected who has obtained
the relative majority of the votes in his electoral district. This means that
large fluctuations are possible, and that a party which has obtained the votes
of only a minority of voters can still achieve a large majority in the Lok
Sabha provided that the other parties fail to cooperate sufficiently.7 In
addition, even if it does not obtain a majority, the BJP can still exert
considerable influence if a minority Government is dependent on its external
support or if there is a multi-party coalition.
3. THE SECULAR CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM
The preamble to the Indian Constitution declares that India will be
a "sovereign socialist secular democratic republic". The word secular was
added (together with the word socialist) by the 42nd constitutional
amendment of 1976 during the state of emergency under Indira Gandhi.
This amendment confirmed the secular character of the constitutional
system, which had existed from the outset.
The concept "secular" is not defined in the Constitution. Attempts
to include a definition have always failed.' However, the Supreme Court
has attempted a definition. In S.R. Bommai v. Union of India9, J. Sawant
formulated this as follows: "[it prevents] the State either identifying itself
with or favouring any particular religion or religious sect or denomination.
The State is enjoined to accord equal treatment to all religions and religious
sects and denominations." J. Ramaswamy stated: "Positive secularism
believes in the basic values of freedom, equality and fellowship ... It moves
mainly around the State and its institutions and, therefore, is political in
nature ... Religion and secularism operate on different planes. Religion is
BJP. As one reason for its support for Mayawati, the BJP mentioned the desirability
of losing its upper caste image, but it withdrew its support for Mayawati just over
four months later.
I In 1980 Congress (I), with 42.6% of the votes, obtained a two thirds majority
of the seats in the lower House (Lok Sabha).
I The 45th Constitution Amendment Bill ("secular means a republic in which
there is equal respect for all religions") was defeated in the upper House (Council
of States, Rajya Sabha). The 80th Constitution Amendment Bill added article 28-A
to the Constitution, which was of similar content. This Bill was not even put to the
vote.
9 (1994) 3 SCC 1.
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a matter of personal belief and mode of worship and prayer, personal to the
individual, while secularism operates on the temporal aspect of the State
activity in dealing with the people professing different faiths. The more
devoted a person in his religious belief, the greater should be his sense of
heart, spirit of tolerance, adherence of secular path. Secularism, therefore,
is not antithesis of religious devoutness. Our religious tolerance received
reflections in our constitutional creed." J. Jeevan Reddy held: "Secularism
is more than a positive attitude of religious tolerance. It is a positive concept
of equal treatment of all religions. This attitude is described by some as one
of neutrality towards religion or as one of benevolent neutrality."
All the judges added to this that the State is entitled to take
regulatory action if religion moves into secular fields. Reference is made in
this connection to the provision of the Representation of the People Act,
1951, prohibiting appealing to any religion or seeking votes in the name of
any religion in the course of election campaigns. J. Ramaswamy held: "The
right to free profession of religion and exercising right to organise religious
congregations does not carry with it the right to make inflammatory
speeches, nor be a licence to spread violence, nor speak religious
intolerance as an aspect of religious faiths. They are subject to the State
control."
The State may therefore regulate the practice of religion, but seven
of the nine judges expressly held that "secularism" should be regarded as
"a part of the basic structure of the Constitution", which means that it may
not changed fundamentally even in the case of an amendment to the
Constitution. This will be discussed below.
The secular character of the State is elaborated in numerous articles
of the Constitution, particularly in the form of fundamental rights. Articles
14-18 guarantee the right to equality. After the general principle of equality
is enunciated in article 14, article 15, clause 1, prohibits discrimination
"against any citizen on grounds only of religion ... ". This provision is
defined more precisely in clause 2. Article 16 guarantees equal treatment in
the case of appointment to "any employment or office under the State".
These articles do not in fact prevent a system of beneficial discrimination
or affirmative action for disadvantaged population groups. This system,
which is now of considerable size, has been of little benefit to the Muslims
as such, with the exception of relatively small groups of Muslims who are
in a particularly disadvantaged position.' As mentioned previously, article
10 The Islamic community has pressed for the system of affirmative action to
be applied to the Muslims as such, but this does not seem feasible in the present
political climate. A minister of the central Government also advocated such action
[Vol. 5:145
THE MUSLIMS IN INDIA
325 of the Constitution expressly prohibits separate electoral rolls on the
ground of religion etc. Articles 25-28 regulate the right to freedom of
religion. Article 25, clause 1, states: "Subject to public order, morality and
health and to the other provisions of this Part (of the Constitution), all
persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to
profess, practice and propagate religion." This is elaborated in the
subsequent articles.
In 1993 the Congress (I) Government presented the Constitution
(80th Amendment) Bill to strengthen the secular nature of the State still
further. On the basis of this Bill, fundamentalist parties could be proscribed
and fundamentalist members of Parliament could lose their seats." Serious
objections to these drastic provisions were raised not only by the BJP but
also by the other opposition parties and even within Congress (I). The Bill
was not put to the vote.
The maintenance of the Constitution and hence of the rights of the
Muslim minority is a matter for the judiciary, headed by the powerful
Supreme Court. This court, which also includes Islamic judges, enjoys great
prestige. Its decisions play an important role in the Indian constitutional
system, rather similar to the role played by the Supreme Court in the United
States. It should, however, be noted that the gap between law and reality is
probably much greater in India than in the majority of developed, western
countries. This is particularly true where deeply rooted social customs are
at issue, although this is by no means the only example.
Any discussion of the secular State can also not ignore the fact that
numerous parties and politicians who maintain that they champion the cause
of secularism still need to take constant account of the Hindu convictions of
the majority of the population and that specific decisions may therefore turn
out to be to the detriment of the Muslims. In addition, it is quite normal for
shortly before the State elections in the autumn of 1994, but this suggestion came
to nothing after the elections. The independent Election Commission seriously
criticised the minister in question about what it regarded as a blatant attempt to win
the favour of Muslim voters.
" Apart from the addition of article 28-A as mentioned previously, the Bill
provided an explicit constitutional basis for the proscription of an "association or
body of individuals ... if it ... promotes ... disharmony or feelings of enmity or ill-
will between different classes of citizens of India (i) on ground of religion ... ". The
duty of monitoring observance was to rest with the Supreme Court. In addition, a
member of the central Parliament or of a State Legislature could even lose his or
her seat on such a ground, this being a matter for the decision of the Election
Commission. An analogous amendment to The Representation of the People Act,
1951 was also proposed.
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leading politicians to visit Hindu temples and maintain close ties with Hindu
religious leaders. In fact, Hinduism permeates the behaviour and thinking
of most politicians to a much greater extent than many of them realise.' 2
4. THE KASHMIR PROBLEM
From the very outset the State of Jammu and Kashmir has been a
problem area in independent India. This is partly due to the way in which
this State joined the Indian Union in 1947.
In the colonial era, a quarter of the territory of the British Empire
in India and over one fifth of the population were governed by over 500
princes. The British Crown exercised "paramountcy" over these Indian
States; this meant that the Crown was responsible for foreign relations and
defence, but left the States concerned a large degree of internal autonomy.
The Indian Independence Act, 1947, abandoned this doctrine of para-
mountcy by declaring: "The suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian
States lapses...". Partly due to pressure exerted by the departing British and
partly in the realisation they were too weak to exist independently, almost
all these princely states acceded either to Pakistan or to India before
independence day. However, the Hindu maharaja of Kashmir, the majority
of whose subjects were Muslims, hoped for the independence of his State
and refused to accede to either of the neighbouring States. He was able to
maintain this position for only two months, because the State was invaded
by Pathan Muslims from Pakistan. When these tribal fighters threatened the
capital of Srinagar, the maharaja decided to call on India for assistance.
This assistance was granted on condition that Kashmir would formally
accede to India. In exchange India promised that, once peace had been
restored, the population of Kashmir could decide in a plebiscite whether to
accede to India or Pakistan. The war in Kashmir lasted until 1949 when a
cease-fire was agreed as a result of action by the United Nations. Pakistan
obtained the western part of Kashmir (Azad Kashmir) and India received the
eastern part (the State of Jammu and Kashmir, referred to below as
Kashmir). The promise to hold a plebiscite was never kept. The reason cited
for this was that Pakistan should first withdraw from Azad Kashmir.
Nowadays, India takes the position that the maharaja unconditionally agreed
2 Even the Constitution contains a small Hindu sentiment since article 48
provides that "the State shall ... take steps for .. prohibiting the slaughter of cows
and calves and other milch and draught cattle". However, this provision is "not ...
enforceable by any court" (article 37).
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that his State would legally accede to India, and that Kashmir has become
an integral part of India. The Indian Government also argues that the
various elections held in Kashmir since the accession have taken the place
of a plebiscite.
Although the State of Jammu and Kashmir is regarded by India as
an integral part of its territory, this State does have a different position
under the Constitution. Owing to the promise of a plebiscite, the 1949
Constitution of India (which came into force in 1950) is only in part directly
applicable to Kashmir: namely article 1, which defines the territory of India,
and article 370, which contains "temporary provisions with respect to the
State of Jammu and Kashmir". The latter article is very complicated, but
provides in brief that further articles of the Constitution may be declared
applicable to Kashmir by presidential order ("subject to such exceptions and
modifications as the President may by order specify"), although in some
cases the consent of the State Government is required and in other cases it
has to be consulted beforehand. The central Parliament has legislative power
in respect of Kashmir only as far as the President has specified so by order
with the consent of the Government of Kashmir. The presidential order in
question was initially the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir)
Order, 1950.
A Constituent Assembly elected in 1951 specially for Kashmir
abolished the hereditary position of maharaja and adopted a separate
Constitution for Kashmir in 1956. In this way, Kashmir became the only
State to have its own Constitution. The administrative organisation of this
State is regulated in this document and not, as in the case of all other States,
in the Constitution of India. The Constitution of Kashmir expressly provides
that Kashmir "is and shall be an integral part of the Union of India".
The political history of this State within independent India has been
extremely unfortunate. The main political leader, Sheikh Abdullah
(otherwise known as "The Lion of Kashmir"), who had advocated accession
to India in 1947, had later become Chief Minister of the State Government
and had won the elections in 1951, was dismissed and imprisoned in 1953,
because he had argued in favour of a large degree of autonomy for Kashmir
within India. The State Government which was subsequently appointed
agreed to the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order,
1954, under which Kashmir was integrated more fully into the Indian
constitutional system. Sheikh Abdullah's release in 1958 was of short
duration, because he was rearrested as soon as he pressed for Kashmir to
be given a real choice. In the period that followed, the State Governments
who/which/that? were in power were always favourably disposed to the
central Government in New Delhi and cooperated in the further integration
of Kashmir by agreeing to amendments to the Constitution (Application to
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Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1954.3 There is now no doubt that the
various elections to the State Legislative Assembly were fraudulent.'
4
Abdullah was released in 1964, but was detained again for a short period
in 1968. After his party had been banned from 1971 to 1973, he concluded
an agreement with the central Government of Indira Gandhi in 1975 under
which the separate position of Kashmir based on article 370 of the
Constitution was confirmed, but at the same time the constitutional
integration of the State in India was maintained. Sheikh Abdullah was
appointed Chief Minister and his party (National Conference) won the State
elections of 1977 convincingly. After his death in 1982, he was succeeded
by his son Dr Farooq Abdullah. The State elections of 1983 produced a
great victory for him, but he was still dismissed in 1984 as a result of the
machinations of Congress (I)."s Nonetheless, he staged a comeback in 1986
when he returned at the head of a coalition Government which, remarkably,
included Congress (I). In the State elections of 1987 his National
Conference party won half of the seats. However, the unrest and terrorism
in the State rapidly increased, and he was forced to resign in January 1990.
Governor's Rule was declared, and was followed six months later by
President's Rule. This situation, in which power is in fact vested in the
central Government and no State Government is in office, has continued to
'1 In 1964, article 356 of the Indian Constitution was declared applicable to
Kashmir too as a result of an amendment to the Constitution (Application to Jammu
and Kashmir) Order, 1954. The article allows what is termed "President's Rule"
(in "a situation ... in which the government of the State cannot be carried on in
accordance with the provisions of this Constitution", for which purpose "this
Constitution" must be interpreted as including the Constitution of the State). In such
a situation, the central Government (formally the President) can assume all the
powers of the State Government and order that the powers of the State Legislature
pass to the central Parliament. In addition, article 92 of the Constitution of Kashmir
contains a provision allowing for "Governor's Rule" whereby the Governor of
Kashmir can assume power "in case of failure of constitutional machinery in the
State". Two sets of emergency arrangements therefore co-exist in Kashmir.
"4 "That the State's polls have been consistently rigged, except in 1977 or
perhaps 1983, is now part of conventional wisdom", according to A.G. Noorani in
The Statesman Weekly, 11/3/1995.
S Pressure exerted by Congress (I), which was in power in the central
Government, caused a split in the National Conference. The Governor appointed
by the central Government appointed G.M. Shah, the rival and brother-in-law of
Dr Farooq Abdullah, as Chief Minister in a Government that depended on the
support of those who had split off from the National Conference and Congress (I).
The latter party championed above all the interests of the Hindus living in Kashmir.
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the present day.16
No further elections have been held for the State Legislative
Assembly, which was dissolved in 1990 (the last elections were held in
1987), and Kashmir was even excluded in 1991 from the elections for the
national Parliament. Although democracy may have functioned extremely
poorly in Kashmir prior to 1990, all pretence at democracy has since been
abandoned. The faith reposed by the people of Kashmir in the Indian
constitutional system has been dealt a serious blow, and separatist
movements which advocate either accession to Pakistan or independence can
count on increasing support. Terrorism, which is supported from Pakistan,
has reached an unprecedented level.
The armed forces have been deployed to combat the terrorism.
These troops are accused of numerous excesses, but owing to the draconian
legislation their powers are extremely great and they are virtually immune
from prosecution. 7 The police too have far-reaching powers and are hard
to prosecute in the case of excesses.' 8 The power of detention, which is
16 Under article 356 of the Constitution, President's Rule lasts for a maximum
of six months. The period may be extended, but not for more than three years.
Normally, a Constitutional Amendment is required for extension thereafter, but in
the case of Kashmir extension has simply been arranged by amending the
presidential Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1954. Use is
made in this connection of the power contained in article 370 to amend in this
Order articles of the Constitution in so far as they are applicable to Kashmir. The
prescribed consent of the State Government is granted by the Governor (who is
appointed by the central Government). This practice shows that article 370, which
is intended as a guarantee of Kashmir's autonomy, can in fact be used in a manner
which destroys this autonomy!
17 The Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act, 1990, grants
the armed forces the power "to use force, even to the causing of death .... to
destroy any shelter, to arrest without warrant, to enter and search, without warrant,
any premises, and to stop, search and seize any vehicle". Article 7 provides that
the consent of the central Government is required for prosecution, suit or other
legal proceedings "against any person in respect of anything done or purported to
be done in exercise of the powers conferred by this Act".
18 Jammu and Kashmir Disturbed Areas Act, 1990, later extended by the
Jammu and Kashmir Disturbed Areas Act, 1992. This legislation includes a
provision analogous to article 7 of The Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special
Powers Act, 1990. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1991,
the consent of the central Government is required in order to prosecute officials
(including members of the armed forces) for acts performed during President's
Rule.
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anyway very far-reaching, is applied on a large scale. 9 There is no civil
administration in the normal sense. The number of fatalities is estimated to
be many thousands. The majority are Muslims. In addition, large numbers
of Hindus have fled.
It became clear in the course of 1995 that the central Government
intended to hold State elections in Kashmir before the end of the year. To
put the population of Kashmir in a favourable frame of mind, the Prime
Minister Narasimha Rao announced that article 370 of the Constitution
would be maintained and that the Government was prepared to take
measures to strengthen the autonomy of the State on the basis of the
agreement of 1975 between Sheikh Abdullah and Indira Gandhi. The
reactions in Kashmir were hardly encouraging. Dr. Farooq Abdullah
castigated the offer as inadequate and demanded a return to the situation that
had existed before the dismissal and imprisonment of his father in 1953. He
added that if this demand was not met, the National Conference would
consider boycotting the elections. The more militant parties demanded a
plebiscite prior to elections, and also announced a boycott. It should be
noted in this connection that under the Representation of the People Act,
1957 of the State, the election of a candidate who advocates the secession
of Kashmir can be declared invalid and the person concerned can also be
sentenced to seven years' imprisonment. In November 1995 the independent
Election Commission, which was responsible under article 324 of the
Constitution for "superintendence, direction and control of elections", ruled
that the elections in Kashmir would not take place for the time being
because "the sum total of factors available at present in the State of Jammu
and Kashmir are not consistent with the conduct of a fair and free
election".' As a result of this decision, it looks as though President's
Rule will continue for the time being.
In conclusion, it should be noted that the Indian Government has not
succeeded in the past half century in winning the hearts and minds of the
population of Kashmir; if anything, the feeling of estrangement woula seem
to have become even stronger in recent years. Why does the Indian Govern-
ment cling on to Kashmir? Naturally, there are strategic considerations -
Kashmir is situated in an extremely sensitive area between India, Pakistan
19 There is a widespread feeling in India that the Terrorist and Disruptive
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (TADA) is misused on a large scale against
minorities, particularly against Muslims.
' The Hindu International Ed. 18/11/1995. Besides the political situation and
the terrorism in Kashmir, another factor played a role in this decision; the extreme
cold in the months of December and January made it hard to hold elections.
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and China - but the main reason for Nehru, whose ancestors in fact
originated from Kashmir, was probably that the accession of a State with an
Islamic majority confirmed the secular nature of the Indian State and was
also a safeguard of this secularism.2 This argument is still important even
today: what would be the position of the Muslims in the rest of India if the
only State with an Islamic majority were to secede? Would the strength of
Hindu fundamentalism not become irresistible and maintenance of the
secular system impossible? The arguments of the Hindu fundamentalists for
the retention of Kashmir are of a very different nature, but are advanced if
anything with even greater vehemence. 2 The Indian constitutional system
would not seem able for the time being to achieve a fundamental solution
to the Kashmir problem that does justice to the wishes of the population of
this State.
5. TOWARDS A UNIFORM CivIL CODE?
Article 44 of the Indian Constitution provides that "The State shall
endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the
territory of India". The Constituent Assembly intended this provision to
kpromote the further unification of the people of India. To assuage the fears
of the Muslims and Sikhs, the article was included under the Directive
Principles of State Policy.Y Although article 37 of the Constitution
provides that the Directive Principles are "fundamental in the governance
of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles
in making laws", it also stipulates that the Directive Principles "shall not be
2 Cf. MICHAEL EDWARDES, NEHRU: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY.
(Harmondsworth 1973), pp. 226 and 271; Percifal Spear, India: A Modem
History. (Ann Arbor 1972), pp. 442-443; Idem, A HISTORY OF MODERN
INDIA, VOL. 2. (Harmondsworth 1973), p. 253; M.J. AKBAR, INDIA: THE
SIEGE WITHIN. (Harmondsworth 1985), p. 244; PHILIP ZIEGLER,
MOUNTBATTEN. THE OFFICIAL BIOGRAPHY. (Glasgow 1985), p. 601.
2 The BJP takes the view that the special position of Kashmir - i.e. article 370
of the Constitution too - should be abolished. Kashmir should be fully integrated
'into India and there should be no concessions to the political leaders of Kashmir.
India should even take steps to liberate the Pakistani part of Kashmir. It seems
likely that the BJP will endeavour to win votes among the Kashmiri Hindus, the
traditional vote bank of Congress (I).
23 GRANVILLE AUSTIN, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION. CORNERSTONE OF A
NATION. (Bombay 1972), p. 80.
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enforceable by any court". The latter provision has meant that a number of
Directive Principles have hitherto proved to be dead letter, even if some
Directive Principles do play a role in case law in the interpretation of other
provisions of the Constitution.
In the 1950s, the personal and family law of Hindus were codified
in a number of statutes.' This legislation also applied in part to Buddhists,
Jains and Sikhs. And there was legislation for Christians and Parsis.
However, the greater part of personal and family law of the Muslims is not
recorded in legislation; they are subject instead to traditional Islamic law
under the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937. Despite
the instruction contained in article 44 of the Constitution, it follows that
there is still no uniform civil code in India. Indeed, the leaders of the
Muslim community treat every attempt to introduce a uniform civil code as
an attack on their religious freedom.
This controversy was suddenly brought to a head in 1985 as a result
of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the Shah Bano Case (Mohd.
Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum). 2 In this case, a divorced Muslim
woman sought an order from the courts under article 125 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure' directing that her ex-husband - also a Muslim -
should pay maintenance. The husband argued that under Islamic law he was
not obliged to pay maintenance after the period of iddat (a period of three
months during which reconciliation is still possible). The Supreme Court
upheld the order made against the husband by the High Court, holding that
the object of article 125 was to prevent the poverty of divorced women and
was not dependent on the religious conviction of the parties. The Supreme
Court added that the former husband was also bound under Islamic law to
maintain his former wife if the latter was not in a position to support
herself.
This judgment caused great consternation in the Islamic community.
This was due above all to an obiter dictum in the judgment, namely that "It
is also a matter of regret that article 44 of our Constitution has remained a
dead letter .... A belief seems to have gained ground that it is for the
I Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; Hindu Succession Act, 1956; Hindu Minority and
Guardianship Act, 1956; Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956.
25 (1985) 2 SCC 556.
2 This article provided as follows: "If any person having sufficient means
neglects or refuses to maintain (a) his wife, unable to maintain herself, ... a
Magistrate ... may, upon proof of such neglect or refusal, order such a person to
make a monthly allowance for the maintenance of his wife ... " It was expressly
provided that the term 'wife' included a woman who had been divorced.
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Muslim community to take a lead in the mater of reforms of their personal
law. A common Civil Code will help the cause of national integration by
removing disparate loyalties to laws which have conflicting ideologies. No
community is likely to bell the cat by making gratuitous concessions on this
issue. It is the State which is charged with the duty of securing a uniform
civil code ... a beginning has to be made if the Constitution is to have any
meaning."
In the same year, the Government majority in New Delhi met the
demands of the Muslims by passing The Muslim Women (Protection of
Rights on Divorce) Act, 1985.7 Under this Act, a divorced wife who is
unable to maintain herself must be supported after the period of iddat not
by her former husband but by the members of her own family or, if this is
not possible, by the State Waqf Board. By creating an exception for the
Muslims not only in the area of personal and family law but also in the area
of criminal law, this Act caused great resentment among large sections of
the Hindu population, above all of course among the Hindu fundamentalists.
Nor are there any signs that this resentment has died away.
In the past decade, no concrete steps to bring the constitutional ideal
of a uniform civil code closer have been taken either at central level or at
the level of the individual States. After some years of restraint,' however,
the Supreme Court once again pressed for such measures with renewed
vigour. The case of Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India29 dealt with a
phenomenon which, according to the judgment, occurs fairly frequently,
namely the conversion of Hindu men to Islam for the sole purpose of being
able to marry more than one woman. For a proper understanding of the
case, it is important to realise that the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is based
on the principle of monogamy, whereas Muslim men may have up to four
wives. The Indian Penal Code provides that a person who "having a
husband or wife living" contracts a new marriage commits a punishable
offence "in any case in which such marriage is void by reason of its taking
place during the life of such husband or wife". This provision does
therefore not apply to Muslims who are married to not more than four
wives.
'It is generally supposed that Congress (I), which had lost a few seats in bye-
elections in electoral districts where many Muslims lived, attempted to recapture
the votes of the Muslim community by means of this Act. Cf. PANNALAL DHAR,
NATIONAL INTEGRATION AND INDIAN CONsTrruION. (New Delhi), 1986, p. 179.
1 As recently as 1993 in MaharshiAvadhesh v. Union of India, 1994 Supp. (1)
SCC 713.
29 (1995) 3 SCC 635.
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The Supreme Court held that under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955
the marriage of a Hindu continued until a divorce was pronounced. As long
as the first marriage still existed under this Act, no second marriage could
be contracted. A second marriage would therefore be invalid and the man
who contracted it would be criminally liable. The Supreme Court added,
through the words of J. Kuldip Singh, that: "Those who preferred to remain
in India after the partition, fully knew that the Indian leaders did not believe
in two-nation or three-nation theory ... In this view of the matter no
community can oppose the introduction of a uniform civil code for all
citizens in the territory of India. The successive Governments have to date
been wholly remiss in their duty ..." J. Kuldip Singh instructed the Indian
Government to fulfil its obligation under article 44 of the Constitution and
also ordered that it produces an affidavit in August 1996 "indicating therein
the steps taken and efforts made, by the Government of India, towards
securing a 'uniform civil code' for the citizens of India". In a concurring
opinion, J. Sahai placed article 44 of the Constitution in the context of the
constitutional ideal of a secular State. He made clear that it would be
permissible to move towards this ultimate goal in various steps. The first
step would have to be "to rationalise the personal law of the minorities to
develop religious and cultural amity". The Law Commission should be
asked to draft legislation, in consultation with the Minorities Commission,
that was "in keeping with the modem day concept of human rights for
women". The Government should also appoint a commission to draft a
Conversion of Religion Act to prevent the abuse of religion.'
The response of the central Government to this judgment was
extremely unenthusiastic. Prime Minister Narasimha Rao stated that a
uniform civil code was not possible and that his Government had no plans
of this kind. However, the opposition leader Lal Krishna Advani announced
that his party - the BJP - was studying the legal scope for introducing a
uniform civil code in the States where it was in power.3 The Government
of the State of Maharashtra, where the BJP is in power with its fellow
0 According to a report in The Statesman Weekly of 19/8/1995, J. Kuldip
Singh had stated during the course of a hearing of a later case before the Supreme
Court that the remarks on a uniform civil code in Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India
had been obiter and were therefore not binding. It should, however, be noted in this
connection that 1. "well-considered" obiter dicta of the Supreme Court are
generally regarded as binding and 2. that these remarks were not impromptu asides
but were concrete orders to the central Government!
"' Personal and family law is on the Concurrent List of the Constitution, which
means that both the Union and the States are competent in this field.
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Hindu fundamentalist party Shiv Sena, has announced that it will introduce
a civil code of this kind. This would appear to be easier said than done. If
such a code is introduced, the Muslims seem bound - in the light of past
experience - to regard this as an attack on their faith, which could once
again create great tension between the Hindu and Muslim communities.32
7. THE DESTRUCTION OF THE MOSQUE AT AYODHYA
The destruction in 1992 of the centuries-old mosque at Ayodhya by
a mob of 100,000 Hindu fundamentalists and the ensuing riots between
Hindus and Muslims were and still are regarded as extremely threatening
by the Indian Muslims. Only a brief account of the incident is possible in
the context of this article.33
The Hindu fundamentalists believed that the god-king Rama was
born in Ayodhya and that the Hindu temple dedicated to him had been
demolished by the Mughals in 1528 in order to build a mosque. The Hindu
fundamentalist organisations (VHP and RSS) and the BJP had campaigned
for years to have a Hindu temple built on the site. Mention has already been
made above that the central Government of V.P. Singh fell in 1990
following the arrest of Lal Krishna Advani, the leader of the BJP, in
connection with a demonstration in support of the building of such a temple.
The Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991 came into
force in 1991. This Act provided that "the religious character of a place of
worship", as it existed on 15 August 1947 (Independence Day), should be
left intact and that any breach of this provision was a criminal offence.
Section 5 of the Act expressly made an exception for Ayodhya, perhaps
because legal proceedings on this matter were already pending.
The mosque was destroyed in December 1992 when several leaders
of the BJP were present, at any rate initially. The Government of the State
32 Another question which may stir up emotions is the judgment of the High
Court of Allahabad of April 1994, in which it ruled that a Muslim man could not
validly divorce his wife by uttering the word "talaq" three times in one transaction,
since this would be contrary to the Constitution. The Supreme Court has stayed the
operation of the judgment and is considering the matter itself (The Hindu Int. Ed.
23/4/1994 and 13/8/1994).
3 For a more detailed account, see my article entitled Het Indiase Supreme
Court in de strijd om de seculiere staat, in Recht en Kritiek, vol. 21 (1995) no. 2,
p. 101 ff.
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of Uttar Pradesh, which consisted of members of the BJP, failed to
intervene and was in fact sympathetic to the cause of those pulling down the
mosque. Following the disturbances, the central Government responded by
taking four steps, albeit not all at once. First of all, President's Rule was
promulgated in Uttar Pradesh and a week later in the other three States
where the BJP was in power (Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and
Rajasthan). The various State Governments were dismissed and the State
Legislatures were dissolved. Second, the Unlawful Activities (Prevention)
Act, 1967 was used to proscribe a number of Hindu fundamentalist
organisations, in particular the RSS and the VHP (but not the BJP).
Evidently in order to maintain a balance, two Islamic organisations were
also banned at the same time. Third, the disputed site in Ayodhya was
expropriated by law. The Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act, 1993
provided that "the rights, title and interest in relation to the area shall ...
stand transferred to, and vest in, the Central Government", which was
entitled to assign all these rights to a trust, but was required in the
meantime to maintain the status quo. It was expressly provided that "any
suit, appeal or other proceeding" relating to the area "pending before any
court ..., shall abate" (section 4, clause 3). In the fourth and last place, the
central Government (formally the President) made a reference to the
Supreme Court under article 143 of the Constitution requesting an advisory
opinion on the question of "whether a Hindu temple ... existed prior to the
construction of the Ram Janma Bhumi-Babri Masjid3 ... in the area on
which the structure stood". In its commentary, the Government observed
that on receipt of the advisory opinion it would first seek a negotiated
solution. If it did not succeed in this, the wish of the Hindus would be
honoured if the answer was in the affirmative and the wish of the Muslims
would be honoured if the answer was in the negative. This position was said
to be balanced by the Government. Naturally, this was open to criticism
because in the event of an affirmative answer by the Supreme Court the
destruction of the mosque would in fact be legitimated retrospectively
without the Muslims having any means of redress."5
14This is the usual name of the mosque.
3' The Government may have assumed that the Hindu majority of the population
would agree to the dismissal of the BJP State Governments, which had after all
permitted or supported the illegal destruction of the mosque, but would be less
inclined to accept the rebuilding of the mosque on a site regarded as holy by the
Hindus.
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President's Rule did not last for long in the various States.'
Elections were held in the four States concerned in November 1993. The
BJP suffered a defeat and was able to form a Government only in Rajasthan
(and in Delhi, where elections were also held). In 1994 the Supreme Court
delivered an important judgment on the promulgation of President's Rule a'.
In the case of S.R. Bommai v. Union of India,3s the Supreme Court held
that President's Rule was valid. Over six months later, the Supreme Court
responded to the request of the central Government and also ruled at the
same time on the validity of the Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya
Act, 1993, which had been challenged by interested parties (Ismail Faruqui
v. Union of India).39 In addition, various courts, including the Supreme
Court, have given rulings on the validity of the Government orders banning
certain organisations.
One reason why the judgment in the case of S.R. Bommai v. Union
of India is important is that the Supreme Court considered at length the
secular character of the Indian constitutional system. Some passages from
the judgment have already been quoted above. The Supreme Court
concluded that "any State Government which pursues unsecular policies or
unsecular course of action acts contrary to the constitutional mandate and
renders itself amenable to action under Article 356" (this is the article that
regulates President's Rule). This conclusion would seem to be a clear
warning to the BJP for the future.
In Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India, the Supreme Court first
considered whether or not the Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act,
1993 (referred to below as the Acquisition Act) was constitutional; only
afterwards did the Supreme Court respond to the question put by the
Government.
The Acquisition Act was held by a majority of the judges of the
Supreme Court (J. Verma, C.J. Venkatachaliah, J. Ray) to be valid, albeit
subject to one important exception: the provision that "any suit, appeal or
other proceeding" relating to the area "pending before any court (...), shall
abate" was declared invalid as being contrary to the rule of law underlying
the Constitution. The reason given for this was that the Act took away the
I The Government of Madhya Pradesh was restored to office in the course of
1993 by a ruling of the relevant High Court.
31 In Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan; the introduction of
President's Rule in Uttar Pradesh was not submitted to the Supreme Court.
38 (1994) 3 SCC 1.
39 (1994) 6 SCC 360.
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judicial remedy "without providing for an alternative dispute-resolution
mechanism for resolution of the dispute between the parties thereto". The
result of this judicial decision was that the old legal proceedings concerning
the question of who was entitled to the disputed structure (which had been
destroyed in the meantime) were revived. The Government would eventually
have to transfer the area to the persons held to be entitled to it on the basis
of the court judgments. In fact, no indication whatsoever was given that
these proceedings would be accelerated.
The minority of the Supreme Court (J. Bharucha and J. Ahmadi)
expressly dissented. The view of these judges on the Acquisition Act was
much more damning: they held that its provisions "offend the principle of
secularism, which is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution, being
slanted in favour of one religious community as against another".
The Supreme Court was unanimous in its reaction to the reference
by the central Government (formally the President) on the basis of the
article 143 of the Constitution: the Supreme Court refused to give an
answer. The minority held: "The Act and Reference ... favour one religious
community and disfavour another; the purpose of the Reference is,
therefore, opposed to secularism and is unconstitutional. Besides, the
Reference does not serve a constitutional purpose." The majority expressed
a more cautious view, but came to the same result: "In the view that we
have taken on the question of the validity of the statute ... and as a result
of upholding the validity of the entire statute, except Section 4(3) thereof,
resulting in revival of the pending suits and legal proceedings wherein the
dispute between the parties has to be adjudicated, the Reference made under
Art. 143 (1) becomes superfluous and unnecessary." This judgment may be
seen as clear rebuke to the central Government: its policy in relation to the
major religious communities was less impartial and balanced than it
pretended. The minority of the judges based themselves expressly on the
principle of secularism, but the view of the majority too would seem to be
implicitly based on this.
Numerous legal proceedings were instituted against the orders
banning the Hindu fundamentalist organisations, and not all of them ended
in victory for the Government.' The ban on the main organisation
responsible for the destruction of the mosque - the VHP - was upheld by the
relevant Tribunal. Such a ban applies only for two years. However, the
4 The ban on the RSS and the Bajrang Dal was quashed by the competent
Tribunal because the Government had insufficient proof that these organisations had
been responsible for the destruction of the mosque (The Hindu Int. Ed.,
12/6/1993).
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renewed promulgation of the ban after two years was quashed by the
Tribunal. 4 As far as the two proscribed Islamic organisations are
concerned, the ban on one organisation was declared valid42 and the other
invalid.43
The BJP was not banned at all, although a few of its leaders were
briefly detained after the Ayodhya incident." It has already been pointed
out above that the role of this party in both national and State politics is by
no means played out. The demolition of famous old mosques in Varanasi
and Mathura has now been advocated by Hindu fundamentalists as they are
said to stand on the site of former Hindu temples. Although the leaders of
the BJP have not yet repeated these demands in as many words, they have
not repudiated them either. The position adopted by L.K. Advani is
ambiguous; he has merely asserted that the question is not on the agenda of
the BJP!45 Some Hindu fundamentalists even favour the demolition of
3,000 mosques to make way for Hindu temples.
7. THE MUSLIMS AND THE SECULAR STATE: CONCLUSION
The attitude of the Indian Muslims to the principle of the secular
State is not clear. In the section on the Kashmir problem above, it was
noted that the majority of the population of that State evidently still do not
consider that they have an adequate connection with the remainder of the
Indian population. This spiritual partition between Kashmir and the rest of
' The Hindu Int. Ed., 12/6/1993 and 1/7/1995.
42 This was the order of the Tribunal concerning the ban on the Islamic Seva
Sangh (ISS), see The Hindu Int. Ed. 12/6/1993.
In Mohd. Jafar v. Union of India, 1994 Supp. (2) SCC 1, the Supreme Court
held that the Government had insufficient substantive grounds for an immediate ban
on the Jamaat-E-Islami Hind. In Jamaat-E-Islami Hind v. Union of India, (1995)
1 SCC 428, the Supreme Court quashed the order of the Tribunal upholding the ban
on the organisation, because the Tribunal had not critically reviewed the substantive
grounds adduced by the Government.
" The former Chief Minister of the State Government of Uttar Pradesh, Kalyan
Singh, was convicted of contempt of court by the Supreme Court in 1994 and given
a symbolic sentence because in the summer of 1992 he had permitted certain
building work in Ayodhya which had been prohibited by the courts (Mohd. Aslam
v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 442). Proceedings for contempt of court are also
still pending against him in connection with the destruction of the mosque.
41 See recently The Statesman Weekly, 11/3/1995.
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India has various causes: purely nationalist sentiments, aversion to the
unduly strong domination from New Delhi, as a result of which political life
in the State does not function properly, anger at the excesses of the army
and police, and so forth. One of the causes - and by no means the least
important - is that the majority of the Kashmiri population are Muslim. Part
of this majority is in favour of secession. Some of them wish to accede to
Pakistan, officially an Islamic State, and others are striving for an
independent Kashmir (a solution rejected by both India and Pakistan). To
what extent an independent Kashmir should, in the eyes of these separatists,
be an Islamic State is not clear. What is clear, however, is that separatists
in general have little interest in seeing a secular Indian State.
For those Kashmiris who, despite everything, wish to remain part
of India, the secular State is an essential precondition. The more the
influence of Hindu fundamentalism increases and the greater the threat to
the secular character of the Indian State, the less acceptable integration
becomes to them. At present, it is not possible to determine how opinions
are divided in percentage terms among the population of Kashmir.
It was stated in the section on personal and family law that the
Muslim community regarded every effort to establish a uniform civil code
as an attack on its religious freedom. In this area, the Muslim community
has blocked progress towards the further expansion of the secular State. The
central Government does not appear to be contemplating any action to draft
a uniform civil code, but there are plans to do so in a number of States in
which the BJP is in power. Pressure to introduce a uniform civil code is
being exerted by the Supreme Court, which views this as necessary in order
to achieve the constitutional ideal of a secular State. The Hindu
fundamentalists advocate a uniform civil code for other reasons.
When the Ayodhya incident was discussed above, it was pointed out
that the Supreme Court is championing the interests of the secular State in
this field as well. The Supreme Court aided the Muslims in their response
to the attack of the Hindu fundamentalists and the rather ambiguous position
of the central Government. The incident in Ayodhya did of course not
concern just that one mosque, just as the matter now at issue is not simply
the preservation of the other threatened mosques. What is in fact at issue is
the rights of the Muslim community in India. The secular State and the
protection of the Supreme Court would seem to be of essential importance
to the future of this community. It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court is
entirely consistent in its case law: regardless of whether or not the Muslims
see this as being to their advantage in a particular case, the Supreme Court
constantly advocates the importance of the secular State. A good case could
be made for saying that the Muslim community would be well advised to
pay a certain price for the secular State, namely an adjustment of their
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personal and family law. The only Muslims to whom this would not apply
are the Kashmiri separatists.
The secular nature of the State is not only in the interests of the
Muslims; the same applies to India as a whole. The greatest threat to the
stability and cohesion of India is posed by the religious divisions of the
population. Nonetheless, the ideal of the secular State is by no means
unanimously advocated by the Hindu majority. Hindu fundamentalism,
which has always been present, rejects the secular State as a matter of
principle. The influence of the fundamentalists has increased in recent years,
and the possibility cannot be excluded that they will also come to power in
the central Government, or will help to determine policy either as a coali-
tion partner or by providing external support to a minority Government.
The main opponent of the BJP is still Congress (I), which has been in
power in New Delhi since 1991. This party supports or in any event pays
lip service to the preservation of the secular State. Nonetheless, it too has
sacrificed the rights of the Muslims to the sentiments of the Hindu majority
of the population in the Ayodhya question. Furthermore, in the cynical
jungle of Indian politics in which the most unexpected political alliances are
possible, even the possibility of a coalition between Congress (I) and the
BJP cannot be entirely excluded.'
If the influence of the BJP on the central Government were to
increase further, the secular character of the Indian State might be
undermined by administrative and legislative measures. However, abolition
of the secular State, or a far-reaching infringement of it, would require a
revision of the Constitution. It would be necessary that "the Bill is passed
in each House (of Parliament) by a majority of the total membership of that
House present and voting" (article 368 of the Constitution).' This seems
to be a stringent requirement, but in practice it is less onerous than it might
seem: since the Constitution was enacted in 1950 there have been no fewer
than 76 constitutional amendments! At least as important as this procedural
barrier is the monitoring function which the Supreme Court has taken upon
itself. In 1973 the Supreme Court ruled that a constitutional amendment
which infringes the "basic structure of the Constitution" is invalid." This
' In October 1995 a collection of poems by the leader of the opposition,
Vajpayee, was inaugurated by Prime Minister Narasimha Rao. On this occasion,
the parliamentary leader of the BJP was referred to by Narasimha Rao as his
.guru" (The Hindu Int. Ed., 28/10/1995).
17 In some cases, "the amendment shall also require to be ratified by the
Legislatures of not less than one-half of the States" (article 368 of the Constitution).
4 See Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225.
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standard judgment has since been upheld on various occasions.49 The
Supreme Court expressly regards secularism as belonging to the "basic
structure of the Constitution", as previously mentioned.5" Legally
speaking, the Supreme Court is therefore able to afford a measure of
protection. However, whether this protection is provided and, if so, whether
it is actually effective depends on numerous circumstances.5'
Finally, it should be noted that although the threat which the Hindu
fundamentalists pose to the Indian constitutional system should not be
underestimated, it should certainly not be overestimated either. As long as
India has been independent, commentators have been expressing their
concern about its stability, but Indian democracy has nonetheless proved to
possess considerable vitality and durability. The division of the Indian
population into religions, castes and ethnic groups may cause tensions, but
in some ways it also provides a guarantee that no single group can
completely gain the upper hand and dominate the rest of the population.
Furthermore, one may well wonder whether the BJP, if it were to gain
power in New Delhi, would still be interested in undermining the secular
nature of the State; perhaps it would be, in line with long-established Indian
usage, more interested in appropriating and dividing the spoils of office
instead!
4 Including: Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, 1975 Supp SCC; Minerva
Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 2 SCC 591 & (1980) 3 SCC 625; Waman Rao
v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 587 & (1981) 2 SCC 362; Sanjeev Coke Mfg. Co.
v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., (1983) 1 SCC 147; Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, 1992
Supp (2) SCC 651; Raghunathrao Ganpatrao v. Union of India, 1994 Supp. (1)
SCC 191; R.C. Poudyal v. Union of India, 1994 Supp. (1) 324.
o See S.R. Bommai v. Union of India.
5' Two Supreme Court judgments of 11 December 1995 have caused some
disquiet. According to press reports the Court has decided that "Hindutva", the war
cry of the Hindu fundamentalists, should not be understood in a narrow religious
sense, but as a way of life. On this ground advocacy of "Hindutva" is not a
"corrupt practice" under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, which forbids
appealing to any religion in the course of election campaigns. Even a speech by a
Siv Sena leader that "the first Hindu State will be established in Maharashtra" did
not constitute such "corrupt practice". A.G. Noorani commented in The Statesman
Weekly of 6/1/1996: "The ruling - uncalled for and untenable - deserves a speedy
burial before its consequences lead to the burial of whatever remains of Indian
secularism".
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